This paper explores the consequences of using supplier trade credit within a vertical relational contract. The downstream …rm operates in an environment where shocks may make it unable to repay. The shocks are unobservable to the supplier, which creates an asymmetric information problem.
Introduction
Trade credit plays an important role in market supply chains. See for example, Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen (2011) . Vertically-related …rms …nd it costly to conduct all their business-to-business transactions on pure cash-and-carry basis and the capacity to enter into contracts with delayed obligations is essential for a good business environment. Trade credit is rarely secured on collateral. Moreover, enforcing repayment through the courts can be problematic. The legal cost may be too high relative to the size of the transaction or the buyer may have been adversely a¤ected by a shock leaving nothing to the supplier to foreclose on. This raises the issue of what determines when trade credit is paid back.
In this paper, we study supplier trade credit within a vertical relational contract in an environment where adverse shocks may make the downstream …rm unable to honor the credit agreement. Since these shocks are not observable to the supplier, trade credit, by postponing the payment until the shock is realized, creates a source of asymmetric information. To induce repayment, the supplier ensures that it is worthwhile for the downstream …rm to repay the credit rather than face retaliation (the simplest form being the refusal to transact further).
We identify a new mechanism that makes the supplier distort the quantity of the good downwards despite having enough instruments to set the …nal quantity (such as a quantity forcing contract). The reasons behind this distortion are twofold. First, suppose the shocks are observable. The surplus the supplier needs to leave to the downstream …rm for repayment to be honored increases with the quantity supplied. Thus, the supplier does not internalize the positive externality that a larger quantity has on the downstream …rm and the resulting quantity is too small. It is as if the supplier was facing an additional marginal cost as a result of the relational contract. Second, suppose the shocks are not observable but, even in a low revenue state, the downstream …rm does not want to walk away from the contract. To tackle the asymmetric information problem, the supplier has to leave enough surplus in the high revenue states so that the true state is reported. We …nd that a tougher punishment policy is accompanied by a smaller quantity distortion. This is because a tougher punishment can be used, instead of giving away surplus, to provide incentives to report the truth.
When the supplier needs to address the enforceability of the contract and the asymmetric information problems at the same time, a tension emerges between them. Increasing the repayment in low revenue states or toughening the punishment following small repayments decreases the incentives for the downstream …rm to underreport revenues but at the same time make it less worthwhile continuing the relationship. As a result, the quantity distortion is even larger.
It has been extensively documented, both in developed and developing countries, that …rms make deals with each other and get …nance using ongoing relationships and trade credit. For example, trade credit accounts for about 15 percent of the assets of US manufacturing …rms (Daripa and Nilsen (2011) ). Similarly, the existence of relational contracts has been documented, for instance, by Bernstein (1992 and 1996) The model uses an agency setting where an upstream …rm supplies a good and o¤ers trade credit to a cashless downstream …rm. For instance, the upstream …rm ("she") can be a manufacturer and the downstream …rm ("he") a retailer. The manufacturer's machinery is used as collateral making her less credit constrained than the retailer 1 .
The manufacturer proposes a quantity forcing contract of the form of a quantity and a repayment 2 . The retailer sells the good and pays back to the manufacturer. However, a shock may occur before the payment, making him unable to repay either part or the whole amount. The manufacturer cannot observe if the failure of payment is due to the shock or to the retailer stealing the money and she punishes him by terminating for a number of periods 3 .
This paper belongs to the literature on inter-…rm relational contracts with asymmetric information. Levin (2003) is the …rst paper to introduce moral hazard or adverse selection in a principal-agent relational contract to determine how self-enforceability reduces the provision of high-powered incentives. Trade credit bundled with limited liability imposes important restrictions on the contract that the literature initiated by Levin considers 4 .
In Levin's model, the principal rewards the agent's costly action with an ex-ante …xed fee plus an ex-post discretionary positive or negative bonus. Loosely speaking, trade credit is an up-front payment to the agent. Unlike a …xed fee, it is equal to some uncertain revenues that depends on the quantity and hence the total surplus. The repayment, unlike a bonus, is always positive 5 . Most importantly, because of the limited liability, the manufacturer cannot punish the agent in monetary terms. Instead, incentives to repay are provided by the threat of termination (i.e. value burning). Since termination occurs in equilibrium, the outcome is bounded away from e¢ ciency and the downward quantity distortion persists even as the …rms become arbitrarily patient.
We consider a problem of moral hazard with hidden knowledge, where the retailer's actions are observable (whether he repaid or not) but not the information on which they 2 Since the quantity is delivered before any private information becomes known to the retailer, it is not used for sorting purposes. As a result, using a two-part tari¤ or a more complex nonlinear scheme is equivalent to o¤ering a quantity forcing contract. We choose this contract to eliminate the vertical externalities coming from the retailer's market power. 3 The punishment we consider is similar to how credit reference agencies operate: they "simplify the information about each agent i with a credit report showing when the agent last 'cheated' (e.g., paid late or not at all). This information is kept on the agent's record for a set number of years T, after which time it is erased." Fafchamps (2010), page 57. 4 See Malcomson (2010) for a recent survey. 5 In terms of Levin (2003) , the bonus is always negative -it is paid by the agent when the outcome is high (i.e. there is no shock) rather than when it is low. are based (whether he received a shock and of which size). 6 This asymmetric information problem is reminiscent of the model of Green and Porter (1984) where an oligopoly is colluding in a market with noisy prices. When a low price is observed, …rms do not know with certainty if this bad outcome is due to a market shock or a …rm deviating to a larger quantity. The implications of this di¤erent information structure is that the quantity of the good is delivered to the retailer before the private information is learnt and hence it is not used as a sorting instrument. 7 This paper is also closely related to the literature where an entrepreneur is wealth constrained and is …nanced by an investor, who cannot observe the investment's cash ‡ows.
Hence, the entrepreneur can potentially divert or steal them. Incentives to repay are given by liquidating the entrepreneur's assets (Hart and Moore (1998)), threatening to withhold the investment in the second (and last) period (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)) 8 or carrying on an audit as in the costly state veri…cation models (Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) ).
As in this literature, we also …nd that the optimal contract is a debt contract 9 . The manufacturer asks for a …xed repayment that if met guarantees the continuation of the contract. Otherwise, the manufacturer asks for the highest possible repayment and punishes for a number of periods. To provide incentives to repay the right amount, a smaller repayment is associated with a larger termination period. A debt contract is optimal because it extract everything from the retailer in the default states allowing the manufacturer to soften the termination policy and to minimize the probability of default. The 6 This problem is also known as post-contractual adverse selection, where the type of the agent (that is, the size of the shock received, which determines how much of the trade credit he is able to give back) becomes known to the downstream …rm after having signed the contract. Furthermore, there is no sorting condition as repaying the credit is equally costly for all types. 7 Buehler and Gartner (forthcoming) also explore the use of relational contracts within two vertically related …rms, however their question is very di¤erent. They show, how in a vertical relationship where the manufacturer has private information about the manufacturing cost, recommending a retail price may be necessary in order to maximize total pro…ts. 8 Faure-Grimaud (2000) and Raith (2004a, 2004b) extend the basic Bolton and Scharfstein two-state model to the case where the cash ‡ows are distributed continuously on a bounded interval. 9 Innes (1990) …nds that debt contracts are optimal in an environement with moral hazard with limited liability. A debt contract gives the best incentives as it makes the agent residual claimant in the good times and penalises him in the bad times by extracting all the surplus. probability of liquidation (not re…nancing or inspection) play the same role as the length of termination imposed by the manufacturer. First, it relaxes the incentive compatibility of the retailer. Second, like auditing or liquidating, imposing the termination policy is costly for the manufacturer, because the relation is always pro…table (and hence socially valuable).
The more closely related paper to ours is Povel and Raith (2004a) 10 . The authors allow for the size of the investment to be secretly chosen by the entrepreneur as well as how much to repay and the probability of liquidating. Their focus is on showing that the optimal contract is still a debt contract even when the investment choice is not observed by the investor. They also …nd that the entrepreneur under-invests as compared to the …rst best as this decreases the …xed repayment and hence the likelihood of defaulting which may result in an ine¢ cient liquidation 11 . The manufacturer of our model (the "investor") also chooses to sell less output than the …rst best to the retailer (i.e. the "entrepreneur").
However, because the manufacturer has the bargaining power, the choice is not only motivated to soften the (ine¢ cient) termination policy but also to increase her share of the pro…ts. As a result, the quantity distortion is even larger. The main fundamental di¤erence is to introduce a relational contract in the analysis. Formally, we endogenize the future value that accrues to the retailer if he does not default, as it corresponds to the potential pro…ts generated within the relationship. This change is important in this setup to capture the relational aspect of the relationship and it allows us to explore the impact of the future on the contract. We …nd that the quantity distortion persists even when there is symmetric information as a result of the enforceability problem.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 explores a simple example where an unlucky retailer may lose part of his revenues before paying 10 Faure-Grimaud (2000) and Povel and Raith (2004b) focus on the e¤ect that …nancial constraints have on the choice of output when the …rm is competing a la Cournot with another (…nancially unconstrained) …rm. 11 In Green and Porter (1984) , when quantities are chosen from a su¢ ciently …ne grid of points, a similar result emerges. In particular, …rms "produce quantities larger than the monopoly output to reduce the incentives to deviate from equilibrium play, which in turn allows equilibrium punishments to be less severe. Because punishments actually occur in equilibrium, this reduced severity is valuable". 
The Setup
A manufacturer and a retailer have the opportunity to trade at dates t = 0; 1; 2; :::. In each period, the manufacturer produces a good at a marginal cost c > 0 and needs a retailer to market the product to the …nal consumer. The retailer can sell the good at no cost but he is completely credit constrained and needs to be fully …nanced by the manufacturer in order to sell. As a result, the manufacturer o¤ers trade credit to the retailer, who will then pay the manufacturer back after selling the good but within the same period (so no interest rate is charged). To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the retailer is not able to save (i.e. any pro…ts are consumed within the same period).
In order to remove distortions coming from the manufacturer not having enough instruments to determine the …nal quantity, we let the manufacturer o¤er 12 a quantity forcing contract. Since the retailer is credit constrained, if he does not repay, there are not many instruments available to the manufacturer to punish for his misbehavior. We let the manufacturer use the threat of a T period termination as a mean to provide incentives. 13 An alternative interpretation to the termination is to trade in less pro…table terms (for instance by diminishing the quality of the good). 14 We denote by 0 < < 1 the discount factor and we assume that in the periods of no trade, both …rms get a constant outside option which is normalized to 0.
The timing is summarized in Figure 1 . In each period, the manufacturer o¤ers a contract to the retailer. The retailer rejects or accepts and if he accepts, he places an 12 We assume that the manufacturer has all the bargaining power. We discuss in footnote 20 the implications of this assumption. 13 McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999a and 1999b) …nd that such retaliation occurs in Vietnam, although it is not as forceful as one would expect in a standard repeated game framework. Fafchamps (2004) …nds that only 48% of a sample of Sub-Saharan African manufacturers continue to trade following a (late or non) payment dispute.
14 See Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) for an example in the employer-employee relationship framework. The e¤ect of the shock is to add randomness to the revenues of the retailer. We can interpret this shock as an uncertainty with the respect to the willingness to pay of …nal consumers. For instance, the retailer could be placing the quantity o¤ered by the manufacturer in the market and some periods he is paid a high price for it and other periods a low price. Another interpretation is the one of an adverse shock whereby demand is certain but either the goods or the revenues are stolen now and then (for instance, by an organized crime group). Finally, the setup could also represent a situation where the uncertainty refers to how many units of a non-perishable (where it is not possible to give back the unsold units) 15 or perishable good are demanded every period in the market.
Example
As an example, we consider the case where the retailer receives revenues R(q) from selling the good. However with probability s, there is a shock and the revenues are lR(q) instead, where 0 l < 1. 16 The manufacturer o¤ers a quantity forcing contract fq; D H ; D L ; T g
15 If the good was non-perishable and the retailer could give back the unsold units, the problem would become trivial as the source of asymmetric information disappears. 16 We use this multiplicative functional form for the revenues because of its simplicity, but the results are robust to using a general function. This functional form is, for instance, used in Green and Porter (1984) .
where q is the quantity, D H is the repayment if demand is high and D L if it is low.
In order to give incentives to repay the true amount, the manufacturer terminates the contract for T periods following D L and forever following no payment 17 .
In a benchmark situation with no asymmetric information and law enforcement, the parties maximize their joint expected one-period pro…ts: (1 s (1 l)) R(q) cq. The resulting …rst best quantity is then determined by:
where e c is the e¤ective marginal cost, which accounts for the likelihood of the shock. This is the relevant marginal cost against which we make comparisons. The parties sell less than in the absence of the shock because with some probability they will not receive the entire revenues but will incur the production costs anyway. As the size of the shock, 1 l, decreases; the downward quantity distortion also decreases.
Let us now explore the consequences of asymmetric information as well as of the relational aspect of the contract. Let R denote the retailer's present discounted value of selling the good and repaying to the manufacturer from date t on:
The previous equation says that with probability 1 s there is no shock. Therefore the retailer receives the entire revenues and pays back D H to the manufacturer; in which case she renews the contract and hence, the game remains in this cooperative phase in the next period. However, with probability s, there is a shock that "destroys" part of the revenues. The retailer can only pay back D L and the game moves to the termination phase in the next period. In this case, the retailer will earn again R only after the end of the punishment phase of T periods.
In a similar way, let M be the present discounted value for the manufacturer:
With probability 1 s, the retailer repays D H so the relationship move on to the next period and with the complementary probability, the retailer only repays D L and the manufacturer terminates the contract for T periods.
Since the shocks are not observable to the manufacturer, she needs to ensure that the retailer has incentives to report the true demand. Due to the limited liability, only the retailer with a high demand can pretend to have encountered a low demand:
The incentive compatibility condition, IC, re ‡ects the following retailer's trade-o¤:
if he does not pay back the appropriate amount, he keeps D H D L but this will automatically trigger the termination phase, which yields valuation R only after T periods. For the retailer to pay back D H , the manufacturer needs to ensure that tomorrow's gains from not being terminated are larger than the di¤erence in payments today:
The IC is not satis…ed if the manufacturer never punishes.
Similarly, the tougher the punishment, the easier it is for the manufacturer to satisfy the constraint.
Furthermore, the manufacturer need to ensure that the retailer wants to stay within the relational contract. The dynamic enforcement constraints ensure that a low (respectively, high) demand retailer does not want to walk away with all the revenues. These constraints are:
and
respectively. They require that the future expected value of being within the noncooperative (cooperative) phase, rather than being terminated forever, are larger than the low (high) demand payment. Note that if IC and DE are satis…ed, then DE H is also satis…ed. Since an H type retailer never wants to walk away with all his revenues, we can ignore DE H .
In addition to the IC and DE constraints, the retailer is protected by limited liability.
The retailer cannot be forced to make a repayment exceeding the revenues he reports in the current period. We call these constraints LLs.
Using the above information, the manufacturer's problem becomes:
. 
R , we can see that the manufacturer cannot appropriate all the surplus. The ultimate amount of surplus left to the retailer depends on which of the constraints are binding. To the extent that R increases with q, it is as if the manufacturer had an extra marginal cost and, hence, we expect quantity distortions to emerge. 20 In what follows, we characterize each of the three regimes relegating tedious computations to the Appendix. At the end of this section, we discuss more precisely how the occurrence of each regime depends on the size of the shock and illustrate it with a numerical example.
Small shock
When the revenues obtained in the low demand state are nonetheless large, LL L does not bind. As a result, only IC and DE bind which determine the payments in each state as a function of q and T :
Because the retailer can walk away with the current revenues, the manufacturer can only ask for a repayment in the high state as large as what the retailer can steal tomorrow in expected terms if he keeps trading with her (i.e. tomorrow's discounted expected revenues) and in the low state what he can steal the period after the termination ends. 18 An increase in D L decreases the RHS of IC. It also decreases the LHS indirectly through a decrease in R but to a less extent so overall the …rst e¤ect dominates. 19 Note that
is increasing in T . 20 When the retailer has the bargaining power, he maximizes:
and the participation constraint of the manufacturer, M = 0. We conjecture the quantity distortion to be signi…cantly smaller. The reason is twofold: …rst, the retailer does not need to share the surplus with the manufacturer (i.e. the second part of the objective function is zero), and second, since the retailer keeps all the pro…ts, we expect (DE) not to be binding (i.e. the retailer does not have incentives to walk away from the contract).
Using this information, the manufacturer's problem is:
Note that T decreases the objective function: not only it increases the ine¢ ciency from terminating following a shock but it also reduces the repayment when the demand is low.
As a result, the manufacturer never punishes following a payment of D L , that is, T = 0.
Hence, the repayment are the same in both states:
The optimal quantity is given by:
Note that a larger or a smaller s increases the quantity sold and the total repayment.
Proposition 1 When the shock is small, the manufacturer only needs to address the dynamic enforcement problem. Despite the use of a quantity forcing contract, the quantity is distorted downwards.
When the low demand is nonetheless large, the manufacturer resolves the tension between the asymmetric information and the contract enforcement by removing the asymmetric information (i.e. asking for the same repayment no matter the state). This case is strategically equivalent to the one where the shocks are observable and (LL L does not bind). 21 We are in this regime when the LL L is not binding, which implies
a smaller or a larger s makes it easier for this condition to be satis…ed.
22 21 To see this, imagine that the shocks are observable. Then the manufacturer asks for D H if demand is high, D L if demand is low and terminate forever if the appropriate payment is not made. Therefore, the manufacturer needs to replace (IC) by (DE H ) and transform (DE) in the following way:
, and hence we obtain the same solution. 22 Note that if LL L is satis…ed, LL H is also satis…ed because the high revenues are larger for any q.
Large shock
When the low demand is very small, DE stops binding because a retailer hit by a shock does not want to walk away with such small revenues. At the same time, LL L binds because the manufacturer would like to recover as much revenues as possible from the low demand state: D L = lR (q). The IC also binds because a high demand retailer has high incentives to pretend he received low revenues and repay such a small amount. This constraint determines the high demand payment:
Using this information, the manufacturer maximizes:
The quantity is determined by:
T is the optimal punishment de…ned in the Appendix where we also show that there is downward distortion in the quantity.
23
Proposition 2 When the shock is large, the manufacturer only needs to address the asymmetric information problem. Despite the use of a quantity forcing contract, the quantity is distorted downwards. A shorter punishment is associated with a larger quantity distortion.
When the low demand is really small, only the asymmetric information problem matters as the low demand retailer does not obtain enough revenues to walk away with them.
To tackle the asymmetric information problem, the supplier has to leave surplus in the high revenue state so that this state is reported, which explains the quantity distortion.
There is a trade-o¤ between a tougher punishment and a smaller quantity, because a 23 Note that LL H is always satis…ed as it requires: l < 1.
longer termination decreases the incentives of the retailer to steal, allowing the manufacturer to keep more surplus. With a tougher punishment, the manufacturer can ask for a larger D H and o¤er a larger q. However, increasing the punishment comes at a cost: it increases the ine¢ ciency following a shock as she terminates pro…table trading with the unlucky retailer.
When the shock "destroys" all the revenues (l = 0), the manufacturer terminates with the retailer forever if s < , where s is the probability of the shock and the discount factor. Otherwise, depending on the parameters, she may also terminate forever (for instance when s ! 1), or set a positive and …nite length of the punishment (for instance when ! 1).
This case occurs when the dynamic enforcement constraint does not bind, which
Intermediate shock
Finally, we look at the case where IC, DE and LL L bind. This happens when the di¤erence between the high and low demand is large enough so the limited liability constraint binds. At the same time, the low demand is nonetheless worthwhile to steal and the dynamic enforcement problem matters. In particular, we are in this case when: and
requires the manufacturer to terminate the contract for a positive (but …nite) number of periods after a low payment . 24 These inequalities hold for any T . 25 T is positive because Using this information, the manufacturer solves:
Proposition 3 When the shock is intermediate, the manufacturer needs to address both the asymmetric information and the dynamic enforcement problems. The quantity distortion is larger than in the absence of asymmetric information.
Indeed, since 0 < l < 1 the downward quantity distortion is larger than the one in condition (1). This is because the manufacturer, in addition to preventing an L type retailer from walking away with the revenues, she also needs to prevent an H type retailer from pretending to be an L type.
Finally, we can see from (3) that q increases following an increase in . A larger quantity increases the revenues and hence the repayment amounts D H and D L . Since D H increases proportionally more (because the future becomes more valuable) an increase in the length of the termination period is needed to enforce these larger repayments.
Instead, when s increases, q decreases as well as both repayment amounts. Since D H decreases proportionally more a smaller T is needed (see Appendix). 26 
The value of the future
From the previous analysis, it emerges that even though the manufacturer has enough instruments to set the quantity, she chooses to sell less than the e¢ cient amount in each of the three regimes. However, as the parties become arbitrarily patient, the downward distortion of q only remains when the limited liability binds. 26 Note that LL H is always satis…ed as it requires: sl 1 (1 s) < 1.
Proposition 4
As the discount factor tends to 1, the outcome is bounded away from e¢ ciency if and only if the limited liability constraint binds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, when LL L does not bind, the manufacturer is better o¤ asking for the same quantity regardless of the demand realization to avoid using a termination policy to separate the types, as this practice destroys surplus. When the retailer values more the future, the manufacturer can o¤er a larger quantity and ask for a larger repayment because the retailer has more incentives to repay and stick with the relationship in the future. However, as the size of the shock increases, the same repayment regardless of the revenues would imply a too low repayment. Hence, the manufacturer is pushed to ask for a larger payment in "good times" and use the termination policy to enforce it. Since the retailer is credit constrained and inter-temporal transfers of payo¤s are impossible to use, termination occurs in equilibrium, which bounds q away from e¢ ciency for no matter which .
It is worth highlighting that it is the impatience of the retailer the one that is creating the downward distortion in the quantity. Indeed, if the discount factor for the retailer were di¤erent from the one for the manufacturer, then it would be retailer's discount factor appearing in conditions (1), (2) and (3). In contrast, both discounts factors would a¤ect the choice of the termination policy.
Finally, to illustrate how the interaction between the di¤erent parameters determines the regimes, let us assume that the demand is linear: R(q) = (a bq) q. Figures 2 and 3 depict which regime yields the largest pro…ts for the manufacturer in the space and l.
The di¤erence between …gures is the probability of the shock s. Figure 2 depicts the case where the likelihood of the shock is low and equal to s = 0:1.
The line that separates the green and the white area is l = T +1 where T is the optimal termination policy. When the value of the future is small (i.e. is small) no contract can be implemented can be self-enforced (for low l and ). Since the shock is more likely and the manufacturer does not want to punish an unlucky retailer, the regime IC and DE, where the payment is the same for both states and there is no termination, becomes more common. 27 Although this is out of the scope of this model, the no trade situation could also correspond to a manufacturer that vertically integrates downwards and serves the consumers. and second, the largest shock "destroys" all the revenues so the regime of a small shock in Section 3.1 is ruled out. We do this to focus on the e¤ect of asymmetric information on the optimal contract. As in the example, the manufacturer o¤ers a quantity q, a repayment D(e s) and a termination policy T (e s), for each particular shock reported e s.
Benchmark
When the shocks are observable and contracts can be enforced, the …rms maximize their one-period joint pro…ts:
The …rst best quantity is determined by:
If the demand has the multiplicative functional form: R(q; s) = sR(q), the optimal quantity is then given by:
where E(s) = 
Relational contract
In this Section, we introduce the unobservability of the shocks and the need of relational contracts. We …rst …nd the conditions under which the contract is incentive compatible and/or dynamically enforceable and then we proceed to characterize the optimal contract.
We conclude the Section with an example.
Incentive compatibility and dynamic enforceability
First, we establish the structure of the contract and then we lay down the conditions under which the retailer reports the true state of demand and does not have incentives to walk away from the contract.
Since the quantity is chosen before the state of the demand is realized, it is not used for sorting purposes. For a given state of the demand s and a given quantity q, the retailer chooses a report e s to maximize his pro…ts: = 0, as in Levin (2003) .
Because the retailer is credit constrained, however, he cannot repay a larger D(e s) than his actual revenues R(q; s):
The limited liability condition (4) links the choice of the report with the true state.
For a given q, the manufacturer has two instruments to deter the retailer from underreporting the state of the demand: following a low e s, she can either increase the payment today D(e s) or increase the length of the termination period T (e s), which decreases the retailer's continuation value. Given that increasing T (e s) is also costly for the manufacturer (because she loses future trade), whenever it is possible, the manufacturer asks for the largest repayment: D(e s) = R(e s; q).
In equilibrium, however, the manufacturer cannot extract all the revenues from the retailer in all the states, as this makes the relationship worthless to the retailer (i.e., R = 0). There must be a report s for which the manufacturer does not ask for all the revenues and, consequently, does not terminate, T (s ) = 0 28 :
Hence for e s s , the manufacturer can only o¤er the contract: T (e s) = 0 and D(e s) = R(q; s ), because she can no longer decrease the punishment period to compensate the retailer for a larger repayment. Since the largest shock leads to zero revenues, the limited liability constraint (4) 
Lemma 1 The optimal contract is a debt contract.
A debt contract is optimal in this model because it minimizes the ine¢ ciency associated with the termination (by trading-o¤ larger repayments for lower termination periods in the default states) while inducing the retailer to report the true.
Let us proceed to lay down the conditions under which this contract induces truthtelling. Since 
The independence between the incentives to report a demand state and the actual demand state makes the task of inducing truth-telling quite simple. Intuitively, if it were feasible, the retailer would always report the demand state e s with the highest u (e s), regardless of the true s. The retailer reports the truth if the combination of the repayment and 29 In equation (7).
continuation value is not dependent on s: u 0 (e s) j e s=s = 0 8s. Furthermore, the retailer does not want to walk away from the contract if this combination is non-negative: u (e s) j e s=s 0 8s. In terms of the Example in Section 3, the …rst constraint corresponds to the incentive compatibility constraint, IC, and the second to the dynamic enforcement constraint, DE.
Proposition 5 The agent's payo¤ consist of two parts: …rst, the current period revenues and second, a combination of the repayment and continuation value. The second part is non-negative and state-independent.
Since the rent never depends on the report, let us rede…ne u (e s) = u. Equation (5) becomes u = R(q; s ) + R when u > 0. We can combine it with (6) to de…ne the termination policy:
Equation (7) de…nes T (e s). Note that when the retailer reports s = 0, if u > 0, then the the manufacturer terminates for a …nite number of periods, while if u = 0, she terminates the contract forever. In the last case, equation (7) becomes
In both cases, a larger report is coupled with a shorter punishment period.
Before solving the problem of the manufacturer, let us …nd R using Lemma 1:
The retailer gives back all his revenues if the shock is smaller than s and has the contract terminated for T (s) periods. Otherwise, he repays the constant amount R(q; s ) and keeps trading with the manufacturer in the next period. Using condition (7), R can be simpli…ed to:
Consider a …rst best world where the retailer is not credit constrained. Then an optimal contract could be a quantity (chosen so that the expected revenues minus the production 30 If u = 0, then R = R E (q).
costs are maximized) and a …xed up-front payment from the retailer. If the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, then this payment would be equal to the expected revenues (and hence the manufacturer would extract all the rents, R = 0) and the retailer would never have his contract terminated. 31 We can interpret the above equation in these terms, where the retailer keeps the expected pro…ts minus a …xed payment, R(q; s ), and he never has his contract terminated. The di¤erence from the …rst best world comes in terms of a di¤erent quantity and a smaller repayment amount in order to leave some rents to the retailer ( R > 0) so it is worth for him to stay in relationship. Solving for R yields:
Hence, for the expected discounted pro…ts to be positive, it needs to be the case that the revenues at s are smaller than the expected revenues.
Finally, using (8), the dynamic enforcement condition of Proposition 5 becomes:
In order to ensure the repayment, the manufacturer needs to guarantee that the retailer obtains at least the di¤erence between what he can steal tomorrow if he stays in the relationship and the maximum repayment that he can potentially face today.
Optimal contract
Using Lemma 1, the pro…ts of the manufacturer are:
that is, the manufacturer receives all the revenues in the bad states (s < s ) and terminates the contract with the retailer for T (s) periods. Otherwise, the manufacturer charges a …xed repayment, R(q; s ), and never terminates the contract. Finally, the manufacturer incurs the production costs.
When choosing s , the manufacturer faces the following trade-o¤: a larger s allows the manufacturer to extract a larger expected repayment from the retailer today (and hence R decreases); however, by (7), and in order to keep the incentives unchanged for all other types, this comes at a cost of a longer termination period. 32 On the other hand, an increase in the quantity q leads to an increase in the total payment as well as an increase in the production costs. Since it also leads to an increase of R , the e¤ect on the termination policy is less clear and depends on the particular form of the demand function.
33
Rewriting M in terms of R , illustrates the fact that the manufacturer cannot appropriate all the surplus:
As in the Example of Section 3, since R increases with q, it is as if the manufacturer had an extra marginal cost associated with the asymmetric information and enforceability problem. As a result, we expect quantity distortions to emerge.
The problem of the manufacturer is then to choose s and q to maximize M subject 32 After substituting for R (s ; q), the sign of the derivative is negative:
where the inequality follows from the fact that in order to have R (s ; q) > 0, it needs to be the case that R E (q) > R(s ; q). 33 In the multiplicative example that we present below, T (s) does not depend on q.
to (9) . After replacing R , the problem of the manufacturer becomes 34 :
Note that as ! 1, the dynamic enforcement constraint (9) does not bind. When this is the case, the optimal s and q do not depend on . Conversely, if (9) binds, both choices depend on . In particular, and in line with the Example, the …xed repayment that the manufacturer asks for the types above s is equal to what the retailer expects to obtain tomorrow if he does not repay: R(q; s ) = R E (q). Therefore, a larger discount factor allows the manufacturer to impose a larger s . Also, when (9) binds, an increase in s does not unambiguously increase the expected repayment because the …xed repayment R(q; s ) is constrained by R E (q) and hence remains unchanged. Since the expected repayment remains unchanged, the termination policy does not change either. Thus, the only instrument available for the manufacturer is the choice of q. Note as well that the manufacturer will terminate with the retailer forever if there is no repayment at all.
The following Proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 6
The optimal s and q are independent of the discount factor, , if and only if is large enough:
, where R(q; s ) is the …xed repayment and R E (q) the expected revenues.
35
Since the solution depends on the particular demand function, in what follows, we illustrate these results with an example. For simplicity and comparability with the previous example we use the multiplicative demand function. 34 Note that the retailer's participation constraint is never binding as he always has the option of walking away with the current revenues R(q; s) by reporting e s = 0 and hence not repaying anything. 35 The full version of this Proposition in the Appendix contains the …rst-order conditions from which s and q are found both for this and lower .
Example
Let us consider the following revenue function R(q; s) = sR(q). Then the retailer's pro…ts
, and thus, in order for R > 0, the threshold s needs to be smaller than the expected shock. The problem of the manufacturer (10) becomes:
where b E(s; s ) = H (s ) E (s j s s )+(1 H (s )) s is the expected shock that matters to the manufacturer in terms of the repayment. Indeed, for s s the manufacturer gets all the revenues repaid while for s > s she gets the revenues of the state s . Clearly, for any s < s, b E(s; s ) < E (s), which leads to the downward distortion of q compared to the benchmark. The dynamic enforcement constraint (9) becomes (11). It does not bind if s is smaller than the discounted value of the expected shock tomorrow, which happens for a large . The payment today is the current revenues, R(q; s), up to s , and a …xed payment, R(q; s ), from s onwards. The future discounted bene…ts from maintaining the relationship are constant and equal to M for s larger than s , and
M for s smaller than s .
Before we state the …rst order conditions, let us understand the trade-o¤s that the manufacturer is facing when choosing s and q. If the dynamic enforcement constraint (11) binds, then s is determined by it so the manufacturer can only choose q. In particular, the manufacturer sells the quantity that maximizes her pro…ts taking into account the repayment that she is expected to obtain and that it is determined by s .
When the constraint (11) does not bind, the manufacturer can also choose s . A larger it also decreases R and the retailer's incentives to repay, it increases the ine¢ ciency due to tougher punishments 37 .
Corollary 2 If R(q; s) = sR(q), then the optimal s and q are determined by the following …rst order conditions when E(s) > s :
s :
Otherwise, s = E(s) and q is determined by (12) . The optimal s and q are strategic complements.
Note that (12) and (13) case, the manufacturer would set the …rst best quantity only if s = s 38 , which is not possible as this makes the retailer's pro…ts, R , zero. Therefore, Proposition 4 applies and the outcome is bounded away from e¢ ciency even for arbitrarily close to 1. This is because in order to make the relationship pro…table for the manufacturer, the limited liability constraint (4) binds for some states (i.e. 0 < s 39 ). This in turn implies that the termination is used in equilibrium and thus the surplus is bounded away from e¢ ciency.
When the value of the future is low enough, < s E(s)
, then the dynamic enforcement constraint (11) binds, in which case s and q do depend on . Then an e¢ cient quantity will require > 1 40 , which is not possible either. Finally, note that, since
the downward distortion in the quantity decreases with s , regardless of whether the constraint binds. Therefore, q and s are strategic complements, that is, a tougher punishment policy is accompanied by a smaller quantity distortion. This is because a tougher punishment can be used, instead of giving away surplus, to provide incentives to report the truth. The intuition behind the quantity distortion is the following. The manufacturer always needs to address the asymmetric information problem. As a result, she has to leave enough surplus in the high revenue states so that the true state is reported. When the dynamic enforcement constraint binds, the manufacturer also needs to leave surplus so the retailer does not walk away from the contract. The manufacturer does not internalize the positive externality that a larger quantity has on the retailer and the resulting quantity is too small. It is as if the manufacturer was facing an additional marginal cost as a result of the relational contract and the asymmetric information. 
Conclusions
The goal of this paper has not been to explain why and how much trade credit is o¤ered by a supplier 42 . We take this decision as given, and rather we explore how trade credit 41 The …rst order conditions, (12) and (13) become:
s 42 Answers to these questions can, for instance, be found in Burkart and Ellingsten (2004) that show how trade credit and bank lending are complements because goods are less divertable to private bene…ts than money. In the same way, Cunat (2007) shows how suppliers of services and di¤erentiated goods are more willing to sell on credit than suppliers of standarized goods because they may be harder to replace and hence the downstream …rm is more reluctant to default. Also, Smith (1987) …nds that trade credit We also show that the optimal contract resembles a debt contract. Debt contracts are successful in keeping the termination policy to the minimum while still providing the downstream …rm incentives to repay the appropriate amount.
In our analysis, we have assumed that the quantity o¤ered by the downstream …rm does not change depending on the past repayment history. This framework would be suitable for industries where it is very costly to adjust the production quantity from may be a consequence of an agency problem. Indeed, if there is quality variation in the good supplied, the downstream …rm may be more reluctant to pay before having had the time to inspect the good. Another instance is Daripa and Nilsen (2011) who point out that trade credit mitigates the negative externality on the manufacturer from the retailer's trade o¤ between loss sales and inventory costs. one period to the other. In the future, it would be interesting to explore the form of non-stationary contracts and determine in which particular way the upstream …rm will increase or decrease the quantity in each period as a function of the previous period repayment.
Finally, since the use of trade credit does not allow the …rms to share the joint pro…ts in an arbitrary way (i.e. using …xed transfers), the contract is expected to change depending on whether it is the upstream or downstream …rm making the o¤er. It is left for future work to explore in which particular way the contract would change if it were o¤ered by the downstream …rm.
Appendix
Computations for the Example. When IC and LL L bind, simple algebra shows that the RHS of condition (2) is larger than e c when 1
(1 s) s T +1 > 0, which is always true, and that it is decreasing in T :
The …rst order condition for T is:
It is possible to give a more precise answer when l = 0 (i.e. the shock "destroys" all the revenues), which implies D L = 0. In this case,
> 0 when T = 0 and it tends to 0
. Thus, in the white region of Figure 7 M terminates forever. If
, M still terminates forever if: 
For the case where IC, DE and LL L bind, the comparative statics of s are: Proof of Proposition 4. By inspection, the RHS of (1) tends to e c as ! 1. Similarly, the RHS of (3) tends to c (1 s)(1 s+sl)+sl , which is larger than e c. Using l'Hopital's rule, equation (2) 
Note that at T = 0, the RHS of (14) is larger than e c and that it is decreasing in T .
Noting that as T ! +1, the RHS of (14) tends to c (1 s)(1 s+sl)+sl completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Because of condition (4), a retailer can lie only downwards.
To avoid the retailer underreporting his type, the manufacturer needs to ensure that u 0 (e s) 0, that is, the payo¤ u (e s) increases with reported e s. However, the manufacturer cannot design a contract that satis…es u 0 (e s) > 0 for s 2 [s ; s] because she has no means to increase u (e s) (i.e., she is already not terminating with the retailer and asking for a smaller repayment R (q; s0) < R(q; s ) would make types s 2 [s 0 ; s ] overreport their types). Furthermore, for s 2 [0; s ) the contract cannot satisfy u 0 (e s) > 0 either, because the manufacturer is already extracting the maximum payment and increasing the payo¤ with e s would imply a costly (for the manufacturer) increase in the termination period for smaller types. Indeed, the manufacturer wants to set T (s) as low as possible as long as there is truth-telling. Finally, to prevent the retailer walking away with the earnings, the manufacturer need to ensure that u (e s) is non-negative, which completes the proof. We assume that the second order conditions hold. Note that the optimal s cannot be in a corner as this would give zero pro…ts to either the manufacturer (if s = 0) or to the retailer (if s = 1). We assume that the demand and the cost function are such that production takes place, i.e., 0 < q < +1.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Suppose that the constraint does not bind, the …rst order conditions are: 
